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SEEKING A RATIONAL LAWYER
FOR CONSUMER CLAIMS
AFTER THE SUPREME COURT
DISCONNECTS CONSUMERS IN
AT&T MOBILITY LLC V. CONCEPCION
Ann Marie Tracey* & Shelley McGill**
Since Congress first enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in
1925, arbitration agreements have become ubiquitous in consumer
contracts. Although Congress intended for the FAA to promote
arbitration, Congress preserved the applicability of common law and
equitable defenses, such as unconscionability, to arbitration agreements
through section 2 of the FAA. The California Supreme Court in
Discover Bank v. Superior Court established parameters for finding
unconscionability in arbitration agreements, specifically with respect to
waivers of collective redress. In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
the U.S. Supreme Court, in a 5–4 decision, turned its back on
consumers and section 2 of the FAA, holding that Congress intended to
promote arbitration through the FAA. Therefore, the Court preempted
any application of the Discover Bank rule to class action arbitration
waivers.
This Article explores how the Court used faulty or inadequate
analysis to reach its conclusion, failed to account for the importance of
collective consumer redress in the modern era, and likely invalidated
unconscionability as a defense to any arbitration agreement. Achieving
its desired result of enforcing class arbitration waivers, the Court
essentially eliminated one of the few methods, if not the only method,
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that consumers have to adjudicate legitimate claims that likely could
not or would not be brought on an individual basis. This decision
insulates companies from any meaningful liability that may result from
poor practices or even fraudulent schemes. After Concepcion, only
congressional action can balance the scales between the enforceability
of arbitration agreements and the protection of consumers through
equitable contract defenses. Congress must act now to clarify the intent
and scope of the FAA; this Article offers several recommendations for
such legislation.
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“What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent
the Concepcions in litigation for the possibility
of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?”
—Justice Stephen Breyer1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion2 abruptly disconnects consumers from a previously
available forum to collectively resolve common claims through class
arbitration. Notwithstanding the presence of a class arbitration
waiver in a consumer contract, some preceding jurisprudence
preserved access to collective redress when the waiver formed part of
an adhesion contract and was harsh, oppressive, or unconscionable.3
In a 5–4 decision authored by Justice Scalia,4 the Court held that
section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)5 preempts a
California state rule allowing consumers to pursue collective
redress.6 This decision foreclosed class arbitration not only for the
subject parties7 but also for millions of other consumers who are
parties to contracts of adhesion containing class arbitration waivers.
Section 2 of the FAA provides for enforcement of arbitration
agreements, “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.”8 California law recognized “such
grounds” when a contract fit certain parameters of unconscionability,
which the California Supreme Court described in Discover Bank v.
Superior Court.9 The Ninth Circuit, in applying the Discover Bank
rule, held that the arbitration agreement in the adhesion contract in
Concepcion, which contained a class arbitration waiver, was

1. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1761 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
2. 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
3. See discussion infra Part II.
4. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1743.
5. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
6. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
7. Id.
8. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
9. 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). “[T]here is no suggestion that the quoted language in
section 4 overrides the principle embodied in section 2 that state courts can refuse to enforce
arbitration agreements or portions thereof based on general contract principles.” Id. at 1112.
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unconscionable.10 The Ninth Circuit also held that, as the Discover
Bank rule applied to contracts generally, and not just to those
containing arbitration agreements or waivers, the FAA did not
preempt the rule.11
The issue before the Court in Concepcion was whether
California law targeted contracts with arbitration clauses and thereby
unduly interfered with section 2 of the FAA.12 In considering this
issue, the Court was not persuaded by the argument that the rule and
state law applied to all contracts that were unconscionable and
concluded that the Discover Bank rule impermissibly targeted
arbitration.13
In so doing, the Court rejected what California deemed to be
unconscionable contracts: those contracts where companies set out
“to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually
small sums of money.”14 The Court also gave a cold shoulder to the
Concepcions’ argument that as questions of fairness or
unconscionability implicate “only questions of California law and no
genuine issue under the FAA, it presents no issue for this Court to
resolve.”15 As a result, where state laws address unconscionability
and contract provisions, at least as they may be applied to arbitration
agreements, Concepcion likely eviscerates them.
The Supreme Court’s split decision in Concepcion16 reflects the
deeply and fundamentally divided range of judicial opinions on
consumer arbitration that exist across the United States and around
the world.17 Led by Justice Scalia, the majority delivered a severe
10. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
11. Id. at 856–57.
12. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746. For a report of the oral argument in this regard see
Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Allows Contracts That Prohibit Class-Action Arbitration, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2011, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/28/business/
28bizcourt.html.
13. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747–48.
14. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110; Liptak, supra note 12.
15. Brief for Respondents at 39, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893) (citing Volt Info.
Scis., Inc., v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989)). However,
the apparent reference in Volt was to the Court’s statement “that the interpretation of private
contracts is ordinarily a question of state law, which this Court does not sit to review.” Volt, 489
U.S. at 474. Contract interpretation was not at issue in Concepcion. See 131 S. Ct. at 1746.
16. See 131 S. Ct. at 1756 (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsberg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan, JJ.).
17. See, e.g., Seidel v. TELUS Commc’ns Inc., [2011] 1 S.C.R. 531 (Can.). This was a 5–4
split decision with pro-arbitration policy reasoning in the dissent rather than in the majority
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blow to consumers with monetarily small disputes. Already denied
access to the courts, both individually and collectively, consumers
will now be exclusively confined to individual arbitration. Class
arbitration, the court-created solution to the class action litigation
waiver,18 is now endangered, if not extinct, with a click of the mouse.
It will take only seconds for businesses to amend unilaterally their
online contracts of adhesion and remove class actions from
existence, assuming they have not already done so.
This Article examines the implications of the Court’s sweeping
decision in Concepcion. In Part II, it reviews the preexisting legal
context in which the decision occurred. Part III discusses the
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions delivered in
Concepcion and contrasts their positions on the policy of arbitration
and its application to class redress. It also examines the contrasting
positions on the role of state law with respect to arbitration
agreements, especially relating to the doctrine of unconscionability.
In Part IV, this Article analyzes Concepcion in light of Discover
Bank and the language and purposes of the FAA. This Part also
explores the practical impact of Concepcion on business, consumers,
and fairness. Finally, in Part V, this Article calls for legislative
intervention to address the significant static that the Concepcion
decision generates.
II. THE PREEXISTING
LEGAL LANDSCAPE
The Concepcion decision caps a series of recent decisions in
which the Court addressed the sanctity of arbitration agreements and
class arbitration.19 When the Court first considered the availability of
class arbitration, it deferred to the arbitrator the question of scope

opinion. See id.; Shelley McGill, Consumer Arbitration After Seidel v. TELUS, 51 CANADIAN
BUS. L.J. 187, 202–03 (2011); Geneviève Saumier, Consumer Arbitration in the Evolving
Canadian Landscape, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1203, 1217–21 (2009); see also Liptak, supra
note 12 (discussing Concepcion and businesses’ use of form contracts to prohibit class
arbitrations).
18. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1206–10 (Cal. 1982), appeal dismissed in
part, rev’d in part on other ground sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
19. SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, REPORT FROM WASHINGTON: SUPREME COURT
FINDS THE DISCOVER BANK RULE PREEMPTED BY FAA 3 (2011), available at
http://www.stblaw.com/content/Publications/pub1196.pdf.
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and the interpretation of the subject arbitration agreement.20 The next
time the question was presented, the Court answered it, finding class
arbitration unavailable: “unless parties affirmatively authorize
[it,] . . . silence on the issue is insufficient.”21 Long before the ringing
endorsement of contractual arbitration agreements in Concepcion,
arbitration policy supported enforcement of contractual arbitration
agreements.22
Enacted in 1925, the FAA23 requires that courts enforce
arbitration agreements according to their terms and stays any court
action involving a dispute subject to an arbitration agreement.24
Although the federal policy in favor of arbitration25 preempts any
state law that purports to limit arbitration or to frustrate Congress’s
intent,26 the FAA expressly preserves the application of common law
and equitable defenses capable of revoking other contracts.27 The
20. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (applying the subject-matter
jurisdiction rule and requiring that an arbitrator first rule on the scope and interpretation of the
clause, where the subject arbitration agreement did not mention class arbitration, but the chosen
arbitrator had certified the class arbitration and awarded over $10 million in damages); see
SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, supra note 19.
21. SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, supra note 19 (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (finding the subject-matter jurisdiction rule did
not apply because the arbitrator had already ruled on the interpretation of the clause and the Court
was reviewing that decision).
22. The policy was applied beyond the consumer context to labor and employment as well as
franchise genres. See generally Shelley McGill & Ann Marie Tracey, Building a New Bridge over
Troubled Waters: Lessons Learned from Canadian and U.S. Arbitration of Human Rights and
Discrimination Employment Claims, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2011) (discussing the
judicial policy favoring arbitration in labor disputes and in general).
23. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). The FAA was enacted in 1925 to overcome judicial hostility
toward arbitration. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002) (blaming an English
attitude hostile to arbitration agreements that was transported to the United States).
24. 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–4.
25. Id. §§ 1–4 (covering key provisions including the mandatory stay of court proceedings).
The supremacy of the federal policy in favor of arbitration is attributed to Congress’s authority
over interstate commerce; the Commerce Clause has been broadly interpreted as applying to
intrastate commerce as long as the activity substantially affects commerce in more than one state.
See, e.g., Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 57–58 (2003) (finding that the great
impact of commercial lending on the national economy met the Commerce Clause requirement);
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U. S. 265, 275–77 (1995); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111, 124 (1942); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
26. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477–
78 (1989); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1,
10–16 (1984) (ruling in the context of a dispute between franchisees and the franchisor).
27. 9 U.S.C. § 2 provides that an arbitration clause “shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2; Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687–88 (1996)
(specifically naming unconscionability); Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs. Inc., 498 F.3d
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continued availability of such defenses as offered under state law,
specifically unconscionability, was at the foundation of the questions
addressed in Concepcion.
Courts in California28 and other states29 embraced
unconscionability as one of the traditional contract law defenses that
could render unenforceable a harsh or oppressive arbitration clause
contained in a consumer contract of adhesion. California has been a
leader among states that limit the enforcement of unconscionable
consumer arbitration clauses.30 Various other courts across the
United States, both state and federal, have also held that

976, 981 (9th Cir. 2007); Gen. Constr. Co. v. Castro, 401 F.3d 963, 975 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding
that the FAA does not preempt California law); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs.,
Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 679 (Cal. 2000).
28. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(a) (West 2011); see, e.g., Shroyer, 498 F.3d 976; Ingle v.
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2003); Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902
(N.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003); Comb v. PayPal,
Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100
(Cal. 2005); Klussman v. Cross Country Bank, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 728 (Ct. App. 2005); Aral v.
Earthlink, Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229 (Ct. App. 2005); Parrish v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, No.
A105518, 2005 WL 2420719 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2005); Mandel v. Household Bank (Nev.),
Nat’l Ass’n, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 380 (Ct. App. 2003); Shea v. Household Bank (SB), Nat’l Ass’n,
129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 387 (Ct. App. 2003); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (Ct. App.
2002); Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273 (Ct. App. 1998).
29. See, e.g., Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2006); Kinkel v. Cingular
Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 2006); Posadas v. Pool Depot, Inc., 858 So. 2d 611, 614 (La.
Ct. App. 2003); Sutton’s Steel & Supply, Inc. v. BellSouth Mobility, Inc., 776 So. 2d 589 (La. Ct.
App. 2000); Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215, 1218, 1222 (N.M. 2008); Tillman v.
Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 372–74 (N.C. 2008); Scott v. Cingular Wireless,
161 P.3d 1000 (Wash. 2007); Coady v. Cross Country Bank, Inc., 729 N.W.2d 732 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2007).
30. See cases and statute cited supra note 28; see also Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin,
The Gold Rush of 2002: California Courts Lure Plaintiffs’ Lawyers (But Undermine Federal
Arbitration Act) by Refusing to Enforce “No-Class Action” Clauses in Consumer Arbitration
Agreements, 58 BUS. LAW 1289 (2003) (contending that the California courts’ decisions in
Szetela, ACORN v. Household International, Inc., and Ting are fundamentally flawed for
protecting social policies favoring class actions that are preempted under the FAA). Not all states
consider consumer arbitration clauses with class action waivers unconscionable. For example,
Texas and Delaware tend to enforce them. Among federal courts, before Concepcion the Ninth
Circuit was much more likely to enforce such clauses than the Seventh Circuit was. See Iberia
Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 174 (5th Cir. 2004) (upholding the
Cingular Wireless and Sprint arbitration clauses while finding the Centennial clause
unconscionable; Louisiana’s generally reduced availability of consumer class actions was a key
factor here); Carbajal v. H & R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 372 F.3d 903, 906 (7th Cir. 2004);
Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2003); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105
F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); Stenzel v.
Dell, Inc., 870 A.2d 133 (Me. 2005); Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735 (Md. 2005).
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unconscionability survived FAA preemption,31 even while they have
disagreed over whether any given clause was in fact
unconscionable.32
Defining unconscionability is a matter of state law,33 and
although definitions vary depending on the state, most involve some
combination of procedural and substantive unconscionability.34
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long been skeptical about the
application of unconscionability to the arbitration context,35 fearing

31. Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 686–87 (expressly preserving unconscionability as an
available ground to invalidate an arbitration clause); see, e.g., cases and statutes cited supra notes
27–29.
32. See, e.g., Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (applying Texas
law and compelling arbitration). But see Fiser v. Dell Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215 (N.M.
2008) (refusing to apply Texas law and declining to apply an arbitration provision because its
unconscionable class action ban was not severable). See generally Iberia Credit Bureau, 379 F.3d
at 174–75 (finding that one clause was unconscionable and the other two were not); Blaz v.
Belfer, 368 F.3d 501, 504–05 (5th Cir. 2004); Livingston, 339 F.3d at 557; Snowden v.
CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638 (4th Cir. 2002); Burden v. Check Into Cash of Ky.
LLC, 267 F.3d 483, 492–93 (6th Cir. 2001); Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 244 F.3d 814,
818 (11th Cir. 2001); Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369, 373–74 (3d Cir. 2000).
33. Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 686 (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. 265, 281 (1995)).
34. The definition of unconscionability in California requires both procedural and
substantive unconscionability in the form of a sliding scale. The more substantively
unconscionable a term is, the less procedurally unconscionable it needs to be, and vice versa. See
Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare
Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000); Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 866
(Ct. App. 2002); Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 144–45 (Ct. App. 1997). For
Texas law, see Provencher v. Dell, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (C.D. Cal. 2006), and AutoNation
USA Corp. v. Leroy, 105 S.W.3d 190 (Tex. App. 2003). For Wisconsin law, see Wisconsin Auto
Title Loans, Inc., v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155 (Wis. 2006); Deminsky v. Arlington Plastics
Machinery, 657 N.W.2d 411 (Wis. 2003); and Discount Fabric House of Racine, Inc., v.
Wisconsin Telephone Co., 345 N.W.2d 417, 424 (Wis. 1984). For Montana law, see Ticknor v.
Choice Hotels International, Inc., 265 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2001). For Louisiana law see Ronald L.
Hersbergen, Unconscionability: The Approach of the Louisiana Civil Code, 43 LA. L. REV. 1315
(1983).
35. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (ruling in the context of an
employment relationship); Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. 687; Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489
(1987); Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10–16 (1984) (ruling in the context of a dispute
between franchisees and the franchisor). The same arguments relating to the unconscionability of
contracts of adhesion are advanced by consumers, employees, and franchisees, as they are
typically large in number, in a position of unequal bargaining power, and unable to negotiate any
change in terms. The same legislative protection has been proposed for all three groups. See, e.g.,
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009); Arbitration Fairness Act of
2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); Consumer Fairness Act of
2007, H.R. 1433, 110th Cong. (2007). The 2011 configuration drops franchise agreements in
place of civil rights disputes. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011); S.
987, 112th Cong. (2011).
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that unconscionability was a device employed to undermine the
policy in favor of arbitration.36
Typically, consumer arbitration clauses are buried within the
standard form contract presented to the consumer on “a take it or
leave it” basis at the time of purchase. Sometimes, they are even
added after the purchase under the authority of a unilateral
amendment clause.37 In either event, few would suggest that the
consumer was aware of the clause, had input into its provisions, or
could have changed it if he or she had tried.38 In this context, it is not
difficult for courts to find procedural unconscionability arising from
the unequal bargaining power between the business and the
consumer.39
Substantive
unconscionability,
unlike
procedural
unconscionability, involves a finding that the result, outcome, or
application of a particular clause is overly harsh or unfair to the
weaker party,40 and, in this context, California courts have identified
particular features that make some arbitration clauses and class
action waivers overly harsh or so unfair as to be substantively
unconscionable.41
Arbitration as a forum for a particular type of dispute cannot be
considered inherently unfair or harsh without obviously violating the

36. “The cry of ‘unconscionable!’ just repackages the tired assertion that arbitration should
be disparaged as second-class adjudication. It is precisely to still such cries that the Federal
Arbitration Act equates arbitration with other contractual terms.” Carbajal v. H & R Block Tax
Servs. Inc., 372 F.3d 903, 906 (7th Cir. 2004). But see Ramona L. Lampley, Is Arbitration Under
Attack?: Exploring the Recent Judicial Skepticism of the Class Arbitration Waiver and Innovative
Solutions to the Unsettled Legal Landscape, 18 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 477, 490–91 (2008)
(discussing pre-Concepcion judicial treatment of class arbitration waivers).
37. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744–46 (2011); Iberia Credit
Bureau, 379 F.3d at 163–64, 173–74 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding the use of an amendment clause to
add an arbitration clause was not sufficient on its own to render the arbitration agreement
unconscionable).
38. The basic characteristics of any contract of adhesion are a standardized contract, which is
drafted and imposed by the party of superior bargaining strength and gives the weaker party only
the choice of agreeing or rejecting it. ACORN v. Household Int’l, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160,
1168 (N.D. Cal. 2002). Adhesion contracts are not per se invalid but are suspect. Wis. Auto Title
Loans, 714 N.W.2d at 170–71.
39. See, e.g., Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Ct. App. 2002) (finding
made in one paragraph); 24 Hour Fitness, Inc., v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 553, 541 (Ct.
App. 1998); Wis. Auto Title Loans, 714 N.W.2d at 167–71 (upholding the lower court’s finding of
procedural unconscionability without holding an evidentiary hearing).
40. See Blake v. Ecker, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 422, 433 (Ct. App. 2001); Wis. Auto Title Loans,
714 N.W.2d at 171.
41. See supra notes 26–31, 33, and accompanying text.
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FAA.42 Merely denying consumers access to a judicial forum is not
unfair when an alternate forum of arbitration remains available;
however, denying consumers access to any forum is substantively
unconscionable.43 California courts have focused on specific aspects
of the contractual arbitration procedures that appeared to discourage
or prohibit a consumer from advancing a claim through arbitration
and therefore contributed to a clause’s unfairness because some
procedural features effectively prevented a consumer from pursuing
a claim at all.44 Suspect features have included high consumer cost
responsibility,45 shortened limitation periods, limited discovery rights
or remedies,46 lack of mutuality,47 and waiver of class proceedings.
42. See, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353–54 (2008) (dealing with attorney fees
governed by the California Talent Agencies Act purporting to vest exclusive jurisdiction in the
Labor Commissioner and applying the subject-matter jurisdiction rule to send a matter to an
arbitrator); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123–24 (2001) (finding that the
FAA applied to employment disputes because to find otherwise would undermine “the FAA’s
proarbitration purposes”); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89–90 (2000);
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226–27 (1987) (demonstrating that,
absent congressional intent, arbitration agreements will be upheld even in the face of statutory
administrative schemes to enforce the particular statutory claims).
43. See, e.g., Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 372 (N.C. 2008)
(“Evidence in the record indicates that no arbitrations have been brought under the clause that
defendant has included in over 68,000 loan agreements in North Carolina. Based on this evidence
and the above analysis, it appears that the combination of the loser pays provision, the de novo
appeal process, and the prohibition on joinder of claims and class actions creates a barrier to
pursuing arbitration that is substantially greater than that present in the context of litigation. We
agree with the trial court that ‘[d]efendant's arbitration clause contains features which would deter
many consumers from seeking to vindicate their rights.’”).
44. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893–94 (9th Cir. 2002)
(focusing on provisions that limited relief to employees, imposed arbitration costs on an
employee, and imposed a strict statute of limitations when applying California law).
45. Id. at 894; Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 112–13 (N.J. 2006); VasquezLopez v. Beneficial Or., Inc., 152 P.3d 940, 949–54 (Or. Ct. App. 2007) (considering cost
sharing, class action waiver, and mutuality). California codified cost protection for consumers.
See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1284.3 (West 2007). International consumer protection policies also
insulate consumers from the cost consequences of alternative dispute resolution. See ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., RECOMMENDATION OF THE OECD COUNCIL CONCERNING
GUIDELINES FOR CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 7–8
(1999), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/18/13/34023235.pdf; see also Morrison v.
Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 658–59 (6th Cir. 2003) (requiring fairness of cost splitting
provisions in an employment arbitration agreement to be determined on a case-by-case basis);
Burden v. Check Into Cash of Ky., LLC, 267 F.3d 483, 492 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that the party
alleging burdensome costs has the burden of proof).
46. Anderson v. Comcast Corp., 500 F.3d 66, 75–77 (1st Cir. 2007) (severing the arbitration
agreement’s one-year limitation period and allowing arbitration to proceed under the four-year
statutory limitation period); Adams, 279 F.3d at 894–95 (considering reduced remedies, as well as
a shortened limitation period, decided in the employment rather than in the consumer context).
47. Wis. Auto Title Loans, Inc., v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155, 173–74 (Wis. 2006)
(determining that lack of mutuality was the sole feature supporting substantive unconscionability
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Often, the presence of one of these features alone has not been
enough to render an arbitration agreement unconscionable, but the
collective impact of multiple features in the same clause has met the
test.48
Class action waivers have been the exception. A contractual
term that waives class proceedings has been one feature that
California courts previously found individually harsh enough to
render an otherwise acceptable arbitration clause unconscionable.49
Courts first expressed concern in the context of judicial class action
waivers. California courts recognized that some disputes were too
small to warrant individual processing in any forum. For small
disputes to remain viable, consumers needed collective redress.50

and holding that “[t]he doctrine of substantive unconscionability limits the extent to which a
stronger party to a contract may impose arbitration on the weaker party without accepting the
arbitration forum for itself”); see Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d
159 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding unconscionability in the lack of mutuality of Centennial’s clause,
while compelling arbitration under the Cingular Wireless mutually applicable arbitration clause);
Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying Montana law); E-Z
Cash Advance, Inc. v. Harris, 60 S.W.3d 436, 441 (Ark. 2001); Armendariz v. Found. Health
Psychare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 745 (Cal. 2000) (requiring a modicum of bilateralism); Flores
v. Transamerica Home First, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376 (Ct. App. 2001); Palm Beach Motor Cars
Ltd., Inc. v. Jeffries, 885 So. 2d 990, 992 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co.,
700 N.E.2d 859, 866 (Ohio 1998); Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 861–62
(W. Va. 1998); Shelley McGill, Consumer Arbitration Clause Enforcement: A Balanced
Legislative Response, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 361, 381, nn.108–09 (2010).
48. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 53–61 (1st Cir. 2006); Ting v. AT&T Mobility,
319 F.3d 1126, 1149–50 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding the cumulative impact of the cost sharing
provision, confidentiality, and class action waiver unconscionable); Adkins v. Labor Ready, Inc.,
303 F.3d 496, 503 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding that a single feature is not sufficient to render an
agreement unconscionable); Luna v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1180–83
(W.D. Wash. 2002); Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 372–74 (N.C.
2008); Vasquez-Lopez, 152 P.3d at 949–51.
49. See, e.g., Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Ct. App. 2002) (“The
manifest one-sidedness of the no class action provision at issue here is blindingly obvious.”) This
position did not always sit well with higher courts. The general availability of class actions in the
particular state is a factor when deciding the importance of waiving it. See Iberia Credit Bureau,
379 F.3d at 174–75 (upholding a waiver because consumers in Louisiana have limited class
action rights in any event).
50. The court noted in Szetela:
This provision is clearly meant to prevent customers, such as Szetela and those he
seeks to represent, from seeking redress for relatively small amounts of money, such as
the $29 sought by Szetela. Fully aware that few customers will go to the time and
trouble of suing in small claims court, Discover has instead sought to create for itself
virtual immunity from class or representative actions despite their potential merit,
while suffering no similar detriment to its own rights.
118 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867 (lamenting loss of forum, loss of collectivity, and lack of mutuality).The
Seventh Circuit expressed a similar sentiment in Carnegie v. Household International Inc., 376
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As a result, courts considered waivers unconscionable when
businesses required consumers in California to give up their rights to
participate in judicial class actions in favor of individual arbitration
only.51 Out of respect for arbitration policy, courts severed waivers
from the rest of their respective arbitration clauses and allowed
disputes to proceed to arbitration in a collective form—class
arbitration was born.52 Other times, the entire arbitration clause
failed.53 Some (but not all) states have followed suit.54 The Illinois
Supreme Court, after surveying various state court decisions,
concluded that generally, if the plaintiff had a “meaningful
opportunity to reject” the class action waiver or if the plaintiff
otherwise had a cost-effective opportunity to seek a remedy, the
waiver was not unconscionable.55
Even as California courts have found class arbitration available
as a means of saving an arbitration clause,56 other courts have found
that when a consumer agreement was silent on class claims, the
choice of arbitration meant choosing only individual arbitration and
did not include collective redress.57 When this issue first made its
way to the nation’s highest court, the Supreme Court deferred the
interpretation of the scope of the arbitration clause to the arbitrator
F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million
individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”).
51. See, e.g., Ting, 319 F.3d at 1149–50; Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1175–
76 (N.D. Cal. 2002); ACORN v. Household Int’l, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1170–71 (N.D. Cal.
2002).
52. Anderson v. Comcast Corp., 500 F.2d 66, 71–72 (1st Cir. 2007); Kristian, 446 F.3d at
48; Blue Cross v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 794 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that, absent
an express class arbitration waiver, parties may be ordered to class arbitration under state law);
Dickler v. Shearson Lehmab, 596 A.2d 860, 867 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
53. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 896 (9th Cir. 2002); Armendariz v.
Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 697–99 (Cal. 2000) (finding that severance
would amount to redrafting so the arbitration clause failed in its entirety).
54. Anderson, 500 F.3d at 77 (holding that severance was applicable); Kristian, 446 F.3d at
55; Dickler, 596 A.2d at 866.
55. Mark M. Leitner & Joseph S. Goode, Class Action Prohibitions and the Effect of
Contract Rules on the Collective Pursuit of Common Claims, 30 FRANCHISE L.J. 166, 168 (2011)
(citing Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 274 (Ill. 2006)); see Terry F. Moritz &
Brandon J. Fitch, The Future of Consumer Arbitration in Light of Stolt-Nielsen, 23 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 265, 277–80 (2011) (discussing class arbitration waivers in light of state
law).
56. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1206–10 (Cal. 1982); Blue Cross, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 793.
57. See, e.g., Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 369 (3d Cir. 2000); Iowa Grain
Co. v. Brown, 171 F.3d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1999); Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., Inc., 55 F.3d 269,
274–77 (7th Cir. 1995).
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under the subject-matter jurisdiction rule.58 Thereafter, some
arbitrators interpreted arbitration clauses to include class arbitration
where the agreements were silent.59 Businesses moved quickly to
block the possibility of collective redress in any forum, judicial or
arbitral. In addition to adapting existing online arbitration clauses to
expressly waive class-wide arbitration and specify individual
arbitration only, businesses took advantage of the varying positions
on unconscionability with choice-of-law provisions that targeted
states most likely to reject the unconscionability defense.60
California legislation provides that a court may refuse to enforce
a contract if it finds as a matter of law that the contract or a clause is
“unconscionable at the time it was made.”61 In addition to allowing a
court to “enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause,” California Civil Code section 1670.5(a)
provides, in the same sentence, that a court “may so limit the

58. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006); Green Tree Fin.
Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 453 (2003); Jonathan R. Bunch, Note, To Be Announced: Silence
from the United States Supreme Court and Disagreement Among Lower Courts Suggest an
Uncertain Future for Class-Wide Arbitration, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 259 (2004). When answering
the question in the business-to-business context, the Supreme Court confined the choice of
arbitration to individual arbitration when the contract did not explicitly waive class arbitration.
See Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010).
59. See Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1780–81 (2010).
60. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005) (holding that the
application of Delaware’s choice of law provision yielded a different result than when California
law was applied), remanded to 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 456 (Ct. App.); see also Ticknor v. Choice Hotels
Int’l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 937–41 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying Montana’s choice of law clause); Fiser
v. Dell Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215, 1218, 1222 (N.M. 2008) (refusing to apply Texas’s
choice of law provision because it would require enforcement of a class action ban in violation of
New Mexico public policy).
61. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(a) (West 2011) provides:
(a) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
Section (b) allows the parties an evidentiary hearing on this issue. This phraseology would
provide support for Justice Thomas’s concurrence, which would require any court action to be
founded upon unconscionability at the time of the contract formation. AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 4
(2006)) (“As I would read it, the FAA requires that an agreement to arbitrate be enforced unless a
party successfully challenges the formation of the arbitration agreement, such as by proving fraud
or duress.”). Justice Thomas noted that “a district court cannot follow both the FAA and the
Discover Bank rule, which does not relate to defects in the making of an agreement.” Id.
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application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.”62
The California Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Discover
Bank63 established three parameters for satisfying a finding of
unconscionability with respect to waivers of collective redress.64
First, disputes would “predictably involve small amounts of
damages.”65 Second, one party must hold a superior bargaining
position, and third, there must be an allegation that the stronger party
“has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of
consumers.”66 If these three conditions are present, the waiver should
be construed as exculpatory of the stronger party’s liability for fraud
and should be found unconscionable. This analysis became known as
the Discover Bank rule and was applied to determine the
unconscionability of judicial and arbitral class proceedings waivers.67
If an unconscionable class arbitration waiver was capable of being
severed from an arbitration clause, the disputes were allowed to
proceed to class arbitration.
Generally in this regard, consumer arbitration cases fall into two
categories: the first category involves arbitration clauses that make
no mention (waiver or authorization) of class proceedings. Cases in
the second category involve clauses that expressly prohibit judicial
and/or arbitral class proceedings. In the first category, the resulting
question is whether the choice of arbitration implicitly includes class
arbitration. Although not in the consumer context, the U.S. Supreme
Court answered this question in 2010. In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds International Corp,68 the Court held that class
arbitration is not implicit when an agreement to arbitrate does not

62. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(a).
63. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110; see Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc.,
498 F.3d 976, 983 (9th Cir. 2007).
64. See, e.g., Parrish v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 802 (Ct. App. 2005)
(finding—before the Discover Bank rule was articulated—that the waiver was not unduly harsh),
transferred to No. A105518, 2005 WL 2420719 (Cal. Ct. App.) (reconsidering and finding the
clause unconscionable under the Discover Bank rule), cert. denied sub nom. Cingular Wireless v.
Mendoza, 547 U.S. 1188 (2006).
65. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Shroyer, 498 F.3d at 983–86; Klussman v. Cross Country Bank, 36 Cal. Rptr.
3d 728, 738–39 (Ct. App. 2005); Aral v. EarthLink, Inc., 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 229, 238 (Ct. App.
2005).
68. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
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mention it.69 Agreement to submit to class arbitration must be found
in the intention of the parties,70 suggesting that the differences
between individual and collective arbitration are too great to impose
on parties without their agreement. It seems likely that Stolt-Nielsen
will apply to the consumer context as well.
The Supreme Court had not considered the second category of
consumer cases, those relating to class proceedings waivers, and the
corresponding unconscionability question until Concepcion. In this
second category, two questions arise with respect to inclusion of a
class arbitration waiver. Does the loss of collectability alone or in
conjunction with other one-sided features render a clause so unfair as
to be unconscionable? If so, will severing an unconscionable waiver
from an arbitration clause, thereby allowing class arbitration to
proceed, violate a basic tenet of arbitration and the FAA by
redesigning the process71 for the parties? The severance question
seems to be answered by Stolt-Nielsen; having demonstrated an
intention to restrict class arbitration, it is unlikely to be implied into
any redacted clause, as it would amount to redesigning the process
for the parties. The remaining question relating to the application of
the unconscionability doctrine to class arbitration waivers was placed
before the Supreme Court in Concepcion.
III. AT&T MOBILITY LLC
V. CONCEPCION
Class action and arbitration issues have been at the forefront of
the Supreme Court’s docket of late.72 Prominent among these cases
was AT&T Mobility, Inc. v. Concepcion, where the Court tackled
consumer class arbitration waivers in light of state law and the

69. Id. at 1775.
70. Id.
71. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995) (holding that
parties may “structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit” (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc.
v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989))).
72. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776 (holding a class action waiver must be
contained within the language of the arbitration agreement); Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson,
130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779 (2010) (upholding a determination that a delegation provision in an
arbitration agreement was itself an agreement to arbitration and was enforceable as severable); 14
Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1474 (2009) (holding that a litigation waiver in a
collective bargaining agreement precluded an individual union member from bringing a statutory
discrimination claim in court).
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FAA.73 Rather than restricting itself to the questions before it—that
is, the applicability of unconscionability and whether the Discover
Bank rule impermissibly targeted arbitration—the Court primarily
used the opportunity to criticize class arbitration’s ability to function
as an effective tool for resolving common disputes and to promote
the goals of individual arbitration.74
A. Background
A disputed sales-tax charge of $30.22 for a “free phone” and the
application of the Discover Bank rule were at the heart of the dispute
in Concepcion.75 Vincent and Liza Concepcion purchased a cellular
telephone service through AT&T Mobility LLC (“AT&T”) in 2002;
the service had been advertised as coming with a “free phone” as part
of the agreement.76 As subsequently amended in 2006, the contract
required that all disputes between the Concepcions, as consumers,
and AT&T be brought in small claims court or be resolved in
arbitration.77 It also mandated that a consumer bring any claim in his
or her “individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class member in
any purported class or representative proceeding.”78 At the same
time, the contract change contained some provisions quite favorable
to customers.79
The Concepcions filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California; their claim was consolidated with a
putative class action alleging fraud and false advertising by AT&T80
AT&T moved to compel arbitration, which the district court denied
after applying the Discover Bank rule.81 The court reasoned that,
73. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011).
74. Id. at 1746–53.
75. Id. at 1744.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. The contract also allowed unilateral amendments by AT&T, which did subsequently
amend the contract, including adding the arbitration process at issue in this case. Id.
79. See id. These included a simple process for initiating claims, an ability of the consumer
to invoke arbitration if AT&T did not settle within thirty days, AT&T bearing the cost of
arbitration for any nonfrivolous claims, a convenient forum for the customer, and broad arbitrator
discretion in terms of a remedy. Id. Most notably, if the arbitration award exceeded the last
written AT&T settlement offer, the company was required to pay at least a $7,500 recovery as
well as twice the amount of the attorney’s fees the customer incurred. Id.; see SIMPSON THACHER
& BARTLETT LLP, supra note 19, at 1 (dubbing these provisions of AT&T’s contract with the
Concepcions “pro-consumer”).
80. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
81. Id. at 1744–45.
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although the arbitration agreement had many favorable aspects and
even contained monetary incentives for the consumer to use
arbitration, “AT&T had not shown that bilateral arbitration
adequately substituted for the deterrent effects of class actions.”82
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, also applying the Discover Bank rule and
finding the arbitration agreement unconscionable under California
law.83 The appellate court further “held that the Discover Bank rule
was not preempted by the FAA because that rule was simply ‘a
refinement of the unconscionability analysis applicable to all
contracts generally in California.’”84
B. The Decision
To say that the Justices’ opinions in the Concepcion decision
were divided is an understatement; the concurrence was given
reluctantly and was based on entirely different reasoning than that on
which the Court’s majority opinion was based,85 and the four
dissenting judges delivered a strong minority opinion by speaking in
a single, unified voice.86 The three opinions reflect disparate views
on three fundamental issues: (1) the purpose and objectives of the
FAA; (2) the availability and application of the unconscionability
defense; and (3) the importance of class arbitration in consumer
redress.
1. The Majority
Opinion
The Supreme Court framed the issue before it as whether the
Discover Bank rule categorized “most collective-arbitration waivers
in consumer contracts as unconscionable”87 and therefore
unenforceable,88 in violation of the FAA requirement that arbitration

82. Id. at 1745 (citing Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05CV1167, 2008 WL 5216255, at
*14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th
Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011)).
83. Id. (quoting Laster, 584 F.3d at 855).
84. Id. (citing Laster, 584 F.3d at 857).
85. Id. at 1753–56 (Thomas, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 1756–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 1746 (majority opinion).
88. Id.
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agreements be enforced.89 The Court then set the stage for its
ultimate conclusion that the FAA preempted California law in this
regard, trumpeting the themes of the sanctity of arbitration when it is
contractually agreed on and the benefits it offers.
The Court took great pains to educate its audience on the
background of the FAA and the Court’s role in counteracting
“judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.”90 The FAA’s central
feature, section 2, provides for the validity, irrevocability, and
enforceability of contractually agreed-upon arbitration, “save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.”91 However, the Court underscored the statute’s
“fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract”92 and
declared that it “was designed to promote arbitration.”93 This,
combined with a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,”94
required courts to “enforce [the arbitration agreements] according to
their terms.”95 The resulting position of the Court was that if class
arbitration conflicts with the goals of arbitration, it is therefore
inconsistent with the FAA.96
In the face of the declared sanctity of arbitration goals and
agreements, the question then was whether the Discover Bank rule
and criteria for preserving class arbitration, when the arbitration
agreement expressly prohibited it, fell within the FAA exemption
from enforceability on legal or equitable grounds.97 The Court noted
that under the Discover Bank rule, procedural and substantive
“elements” are essential to an unconscionability finding.98 The
procedural aspect focuses on oppression resulting from unequal
bargaining power, while the substantive element examines “overly

89. Id. at 1744. The Court introduced the central question as whether section 2 of the FAA
“prohibits States from conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration agreements on the
availability of classwide arbitration procedures.” Id.
90. Id. at 1745.
91. Id. (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
92. Id. (citing Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010)).
93. Id. at 1749.
94. Id. at 1745 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24 (1983)).
95. Id. at 1745–46 (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
96. See id. at 1746.
97. See id.
98. Id.
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harsh,” surprising, or “one-sided” results.99 In this vein the Discover
Bank court described circumstances where a class action arbitration
waiver would be unconscionable: when there is an adhesion contract,
when the amount in controversy is small, and when “the party with
the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to
deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually
small sums of money.”100
Rather than focusing on whether the contract in question met the
Discover Bank parameters of unconscionability or whether the
criteria themselves constituted “grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract”101 under the FAA exemption, the
Court reverted to assessing the Discover Bank rule based on the
outcome or disparate impact of the rule’s application. If after
applying the Discover Bank rule courts find most collective
arbitration waivers in consumer contracts unconscionable102 and
therefore unenforceable,103 then the test must be targeting arbitration
agreements. This characterization facilitated the Court’s use of a
monocular lens—“When state law prohibits outright the arbitration
of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The
conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA.”104
Although the Court had already answered the issue to its
satisfaction, it went on to note that the issue became “more complex”
when a generally applicable doctrine, such as unconscionability, was
applied in a “fashion that disfavors arbitration.”105 The Court then
resurrected a footnote from Perry v. Thomas106 for the proposition
that “a court may not ‘rely upon the uniqueness of an agreement to
arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be
unconscionable, for this would enable the court to effect what . . . the
state legislature cannot.’”107
As the Court had already described the Discover Bank rule as
prohibiting “most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer
99. Id. (citing Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal.
2000); accord Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005)).
100. Id. (citing Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1110).
101. Id. at 1745 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006)).
102. Id. at 1746.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1747 (citing Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353 (2008)).
105. Id.
106. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
107. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747 (citing Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987)).
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contracts as unconscionable,”108 the next step in the Court’s analysis
was an easy connection. When “[r]equiring the availability of
classwide arbitration”109 eviscerates FAA objectives,110 the
“conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA,”111 as states may not adopt
their own, differing analysis.112 The Court then concluded that the
Discover Bank rule was preempted because it “[stood] as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress” in enacting the FAA,113 which the Court had
defined as promoting the goals of arbitration.114
2. Justice Thomas’s
Concurrence
Justice Thomas reluctantly concurred in the judgment, but his
reasoning was entirely different from that of the majority. Rather
than finding, as did the majority, that the Discover Bank rule was a
targeted attack on arbitration, Justice Thomas placed a narrow limit
on the availability of FAA section 2 contract defenses. In his view,
only successful challenges to the formation of an arbitration
agreement should fall within the FAA exemption, a prerequisite that
the Discover Bank rule did not impose.115 Justice Thomas concluded
that the language of section 2 suggests that the FAA exemption
covers only defenses capable of revoking a contract, not defenses
related to invalidity or unenforceability.116 Although prior
jurisprudence tended to use the concepts of invalidity, revocation,
and unenforceability interchangeably, that was incorrect, according
to Justice Thomas.

108. Id. at 1746.
109. Id. at 1748.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1747 (citing Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U. S. 346, 353 (2008)).
112. Id. at 1747–48.
113. Id. at 1753 (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
114. Id. at 1749.
115. Id. at 1753 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas cited that fraud or duress were such
examples. Id. The Concepcions alleged fraud in the class action. Justice Thomas acknowledged
that this was not an issue “fully developed by any party . . . and could benefit from briefing and
argument in an appropriate case.” Id. at 1754.
116. Id. at 1753–54 (applying the statutory interpretation rules articulated in Duncan v.
Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001), and Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997), to
the language of section 2 where the enforcement phase refers to validity, revocation, and
enforceability while the exemption references only revocation).
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Under Justice Thomas’s interpretation, a court must order
arbitration if there is no issue with respect to the making or
formatting of the agreement for arbitration and “defenses unrelated
to the making of the agreement—such as public policy—could not be
the basis of declining to enforce an arbitration clause.”117 Justice
Thomas recognized only fraud, undue influence, mutual mistake,
duress, and delusion as likely available defenses.118 Noticeably
missing is unconscionability, which is probably because of its
substantive
unconscionability
component.
Procedural
unconscionability deals with the formation of a contract; substantive
unconscionability focuses instead on the fairness of the provisions.119
The Discover Bank rule, Justice Thomas noted, did not relate
exclusively to formation of an agreement120 but rather to exculpatory
contractual terms contrary to public policy. Under the Thomas
interpretation of section 2, these were not grounds for revoking the
contract.121
3. Justice Breyer’s
Dissent
Justice Breyer challenged the majority and concurring opinions
in their entireties. First, Justice Breyer and his fellow dissenters
viewed the Discover Bank rule not as an obstacle to section 2 of the
FAA but as a means to further its purposes.122 The rule not only
applied equally to class arbitration and class litigation alike123—
thereby not disfavoring or targeting arbitration agreements as a
dispute resolution mechanism124—but also was in keeping with the
basic purpose of the FAA “to make valid and enforceable
agreements for arbitration.”125

117. Id. at 1755.
118. Id. at 1754–56.
119. See id. at 1746 (majority opinion).
120. Id. at 1753 (Thomas, J., concurring).
121. However, the California law upon which the Discover Bank rule is founded does
embrace contract formation as a requirement; there is nothing in the Discover Bank opinion to
suggest that the court intended to eliminate it. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5(a) (West 2011).
122. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1759–60 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
123. Id. at 1757.
124. Id. at 1759–60 (noting that the “Discover Bank rule imposes equivalent limitations on
litigation” and therefore cannot violate the rule against targeting arbitration per se).
125. Id. at 1757 (quoting Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 274 n.2 (1932)).
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Next, Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Ginsburg found,
without support, that the majority’s contention that class arbitration
was inconsistent with arbitration was a tool.126 They challenged any
suggestion that class arbitration was without merit127 and highlighted
its advantages, especially for small claims that offer little economic
incentive to pursue individually.128 The dissent found the majority’s
comparison of class arbitration to individual arbitration inapplicable
and suggested the appropriate comparison was to judicial class
proceedings.129 Finally, the dissenting Justices found no precedent
for the majority’s striking down of a “state statute that treats
arbitrations on par with judicial and administrative proceedings,”130
especially in a way that interfered with the role of states with respect
to arbitration agreements and contractual defenses that Congress
preserved in the FAA.131
At the heart of these differences with the majority was the
dissent’s more neutral view of the FAA’s purpose.132 The dissenting
Justices defined the purpose of the FAA as to enforce arbitration
agreements just like other contracts, not to promote the expeditious
resolution of claims through arbitration or to prefer arbitration
agreements over other forms of contracts.133 The dissenting Justices
would have preserved the application of the traditional
unconscionability rule, understanding that only some class arbitration
waivers will fall below the standard set by the Discover Bank rule.134
C. Analysis
The majority in Concepcion dropped its call in several key
respects. First, the Court side stepped the essence of the Discover
Bank rule and applied its own myopic interpretation in order to
achieve its desired result: enforcing the class arbitration waiver. In so
doing, the Court failed to address adequately whether, through the
FAA, Congress intended to allow such defenses as fraud and

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 1758.
Id. at 1758–62.
Id. at 1761.
Id. at 1759.
Id. at 1761.
Id. at 1761–62.
See id. at 1756.
Id. at 1757–58.
Id. at 1757.
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unconscionability to block enforcement of an arbitration agreement.
Further, the Court did not acknowledge a state’s power to define
unconscionability. Finally, it inadequately framed the purpose of the
FAA as “promoting arbitration” and embarked on a dissertation on
the benefits of arbitration, with at least two critical repercussions.
Therefore, it failed to acknowledge the extent to which class
arbitration is consistent with the terms and spirit of the FAA. And
despite professing to be merely “plac[ing] arbitration agreements on
an equal footing with other contracts,”135 the Court actually tipped
the scales in favor of enforcing arbitration contracts over all others.
As a result, Concepcion undercuts the purposes of the FAA and
effectively eliminates class arbitration as a means to collectively
resolve consumer disputes. In so doing, it not only creates a
deafening static that blocks out consumer and likely other concerns,
but it also invites a congressional response.
1. The Letter and Spirit of the FAA
and the Discover Bank Rule
Congress enacted the FAA to counter judicial hostility to
arbitration agreements136 and to ensure that private agreements to
arbitrate “are enforced according to their terms.”137 While in keeping
with these purposes, the Court, in holding that the FAA preempted
California law, made sweeping presumptions in two primary
respects. First, it characterized the Discover Bank rule as an
impermissible blanket prohibition of most class arbitration waivers.
In the same breath, the Court dismissed unconscionability, as
reflected in Discover Bank and other similar state jurisprudence, as a
ground the FAA recognized as rendering an arbitration agreement
unenforceable. Second, the Court read into the adhesion contract at
issue traditional principles of contract formation, such as negotiation,
and used these as a basis for its reasoning. As applied to consumer
adhesion agreements and unconscionability, the Court’s approach
undermines the letter and spirit of the FAA and disregards wellestablished contract principles surrounding agreements and fairness.

135. Id. at 1745 (majority opinion) (citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546
U.S. 440, 443 (2006)).
136. Id. For a discussion of the purposes and processes under the FAA, see McGill & Tracey,
supra note 22, at 13–16.
137. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.
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a. Class arbitration and
the Discover Bank rule
To the extent that state laws target and discriminate against
arbitration, they are inconsistent with the FAA and are overridden by
it.138 On the other hand, to the extent that a state law does not block
the enforceability of an arbitration agreement, the FAA does not
preempt it “even if the law encumbers arbitration in other ways.”139
Unfortunately, the Court adopted the view that the Discover Bank
rule140 condemned “most collective arbitration waivers in consumer
contracts as unconscionable”141 seemingly without examining
whether the Discover Bank rule actually invalidated most consumer
contracts. While application of the Discover Bank principles might
indeed invalidate a class arbitration waiver, this result was far from a
given. In reality, the rule was far from a sweeping ban targeting class
arbitration.
The Concepcion majority seemed determined to ignore that the
Discover Bank rule applied to more than just arbitration agreements
and only within certain parameters and circumstances. At the same
time, it dogmatically refused to assess the circumstances of the case
before it. To pass Discover Bank muster, a contract must be both
procedurally and substantively unconscionable. In the former
category, because of the superior bargaining position of one party
and the opportunity of the other party to either adhere to or reject a
contract, such contracts “of adhesion” are procedurally
unconscionable.142 With respect to substantive unconscionability, the
California Supreme Court explained that there is an oppressive or

138. See id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
139. Hiro N. Aragaki, Arbitration’s Suspect Status, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1233, 1243 (2011)
(describing examples of laws that encumber arbitration, including procedural and ethical rules
regarding arbitration and appeal provisions).
140. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746.
141. Id. at 1746.
142. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005). As the Discover
Bank court observed, adhesion contracts typically are one sided, providing benefits or protections
to the stronger party and not to the consumer. See id. at 1108–09. However, that court’s decision
did not invalidate all adhesion contracts, including those with waivers of class arbitration. Id. at
1109. As a result, those fall “within the FAA’s exception” permitting nonenforcement of
arbitration agreements on grounds that would apply to any contract. Donald J. Friedman et al.,
United States: Supreme Court Holds That Consumer Arbitration Agreements Can Bar Class
Action Relief, MONDAQ.COM (May 5, 2011), http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/
article.asp?articleid=131316&print=1.
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“surprise” element.143 Such unfairness could render a “consumer
contract[] of adhesion . . . unenforceable, whether the consumer is
being asked to waive the right to class action litigation or the right to
classwide arbitration.”144 The rule applied uniformly to arbitration,
judicial, and administrative proceedings,145 and “equally to class
action litigation waivers in contracts without arbitration agreements
and to class arbitration waivers in contracts with such
agreements.”146 As the rule did not target arbitration contracts, it fell
directly within the FAA’s enforcement exceptions.147
Without analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court declared the Discover
Bank principles so sweeping as to invalidate the class action waiver
in the case before it and indeed in all such waivers, perhaps
indicating of a rush to judgment. As such, the Court’s decision in
Concepcion was a missed opportunity for it to address
unconscionability in the context of the FAA. Before the Court issued
its decision in Concepcion, contracts in California that effectively
insulated parties from liability while not per se unconscionable,
could be deemed unconscionable.148 The Court’s elimination of such
unconscionability defenses in California and elsewhere, at least
where a contract contains an arbitration clause, is especially
troublesome where the party with the superior bargaining power has
“carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of
consumers out of individually small sums of money.”149
Moreover, had the Court examined the AT&T contract at issue,
it would have found significant support for an argument that the
contract was not unconscionable. Indeed, the clause at issue had a
good chance to pass such scrutiny. While it was an adhesion
contract, the arbitration clause offered significant incentives for the

143. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1108.
144. Id. at 1103; see Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1756 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
145. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at
1112.
146. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1112; see Friedman et al., supra note 142.
147. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1757 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
148. Discover Bank, 113 P.3d at 1108. The Discover Bank court held that such may be the
case under California law where the agreement at issue is an exculpatory contract; that is, the
object of the contract clause is to directly or indirectly “exempt anyone from responsibility for his
own fraud, or willful injury . . . or other violation of [the] law” against public policy. Id. (citing
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1668 (West 2011)).
149. Id. at 1110.
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consumer to pursue individual arbitration and substantial penalties
against the company.150
Further, an approach directed at examining more broadly
whether contract defenses provided by state law met the exemption
of the FAA for “grounds as exist at law or equity” would have
offered meaningful guidance to courts, businesses, and practitioners.
At the same time, it may have raised numerous questions about state
law, even opening “a floodgate of future litigation” with respect to
individual class arbitration waivers and whether they were
unconscionable.151 If nothing else, the Concepcion decision was
clear: class action waivers in consumer contracts are enforceable.
b. Adhesion arbitration waivers and the
FAA’s negotiated agreement presumption
Including a class action waiver in a modern-day adhesion
contract raises an unconscionability “red flag” that Congress hardly
could have anticipated when it adopted the FAA. From that 1925
time frame and until computer use became common, as many may
remember, the physical act of drafting and revising legal documents
was no easy task. Now, in the twenty-first century, using carbon
paper or Wite-Out would be ludicrous. In the past, disseminating
contract amendments would have been by wheel, rail, or human
delivery. Posting not only the contract itself but also changes and
amendments through the Internet, may mean a party has never seen
the provisions at issue. Nevertheless, the Concepcion Court turned a
blind eye to the realities of today’s mass adhesion contracts and their
lack of the attributes typically enjoyed in individually negotiated
agreements.
Consumer arbitration agreements lack the fundamental
foundation of contractual arbitration that Congress likely anticipated:
equal bargaining power152 and parties engaged in, and designing,

150. Terms of the clause included the waiver of AT&T attorney fees, the obligation of AT&T
to pay for all costs of nonfrivolous claims, and a penalty of $7,500 plus double consumer
attorney’s fees if the consumer is awarded an amount higher than AT&T’s last settlement offer.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744, 1753.
151. Jean R. Sternlight, Cert Granted in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, TODAY’S
WORKPLACE (May 26, 2010), http://www.todaysworkplace.org/2010/05/26/cert-granted-in-attmobility-v-concepcion.
152. As Justice Breyer wrote in the dissent, Congress very well may have meant to enforce
arbitration among merchants with factual, not legal, disputes, “under the customs of their
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their own dispute resolution process. However, while professing
loyalty to the basic tenets of arbitration and its contractual roots, the
majority opinion in Concepcion refused to acknowledge that the
dynamics of consumer and business arbitration agreements differ
markedly in key respects. A consumer adhesion contract, unlike a
unique or business-to-business contract, involves no negotiating
between the parties. Rather, it is presented to the consumer on a
“take it or leave it” basis. The practice is so common that there is no
real alternative for consumers in the marketplace. While certainly
parties are responsible for contracts that they enter into, the lack of
meaningful negotiation or choice shifts the dynamics considerably: if
you want a cellular phone, you must waive arbitration.153
Typically, consumers are unaware of any arbitration clause or, at
best, are naïve about its implications. Consumers certainly are not
conversant in negotiating arbitration processes. While the Court
played up the advantages of negotiating,154 it is far-fetched to suggest
that the Concepcions or other consumers of electronic equipment or
other mass-produced, non-custom goods play a role in designing
arbitration procedures.155 Bargaining and negotiating in such
consumer agreements are relics of the past, and consumers have no
opportunity to negotiate the terms of a contract. In this context, the
Court, professing to honor the intentions of the parties, was
incongruous. Consequently, though arbitration policy articulated in
the FAA favors honoring parties’ expectations, in Concepcion the
Supreme Court honored only AT&T’s expectations.156 Until courts
and Congress come to terms with the fallacy of consumer consent,
arbitration policy, as framed by the Concepcion majority, will remain
out of step with the modern marketplace.

industries, where the parties possessed roughly equivalent bargaining power.” Concepcion, 131 S.
Ct. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
153. See Aragaki, supra note 139, at 1261–62 & n.154.
154. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751–52. For example, the Court noted that parties can design
“efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute,” even specifying designating a
specialist arbitrator and requiring protection of trade secrets. Id. at 1749.
155. This is especially true where, as here, the contract was amended to revise arbitration
provisions, albeit favorable ones, after the parties initially agreed to the contract. Id. at 1744.
156. This is underscored by the Court’s incongruous denunciation of California law allowing
consumers to demand arbitration after the fact, id. at 1748, 1750; here, the arbitration procedures
were added to the contract more than three years after the parties entered into it, a move that was
likely designed to meet the criteria articulated the previous year in Discover Bank. Id. at 1744.
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2. Class Arbitration: Viable, Meaningful,
and in Keeping with FAA Purposes
The evaluation of the drawbacks of class-wide arbitration in
Concepcion157 was not unlike comparing landlines to cell phones
only in terms of mobility. In its analysis, the Court compared
individual arbitration to class arbitration rather than weigh the utility
of class arbitration head on. It addressed speed to disposition on the
merits (and not other means of resolution such as settlement,
withdrawal, or dismissal). It observed that bilateral (individual claim)
arbitration is faster than arbitrating a class claim, citing the need to
certify the class and how discovery is conducted,158 without
examining issues with multiple individual claims. Its conclusion that
individual, and not collective, arbitration is fundamental to the
concept of arbitration159 is disappointing. The dissent’s comparison
of class arbitration to class litigation, and not to individual bilateral
arbitration, is more instructive.160
Class arbitration, if agreed to by the parties,161 is in keeping with
the letter and the spirit of the FAA,162 as well as “the use of
arbitration.”163 While resolving an individual claim is certainly less
time consuming and complex than completing a class claim is, the
cumulative effort of resolving numerous, similarly situated
individual claims can be enormous and reflect a comparable
expenditure of time and money. Individual arbitrations also evoke
the specter of different outcomes for essentially identical claims and
have their own defects, especially when dealing with similarly
situated claims.164
Chief among arbitration’s benefits are party-designed “efficient,
streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute.”165 While the
majority opinion deemed these advantages lost with class arbitration,
in so doing, the majority implicitly rejected its own observation that
157. Id. at 1750–53.
158. Id. at 1751.
159. Id. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 1751 n.7 (majority opinion).
161. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775–76 (2010).
162. See Moritz & Fitch, supra note 55, at 271.
163. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
164. These drawbacks include inaccessibility by other claimants or the public to the claims
and outcome, discovery issues, and correctness and review issues. See McGill & Tracey, supra
note 22.
165. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749.

464

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:435

the arbitration agreement itself could simplify procedures.166 After
all, the American Arbitration Association deems “class arbitration to
be ‘a fair, balanced and efficient means of resolving class
disputes.’”167
Certainly, class arbitration is not without its drawbacks for
businesses and consumers. For both, it is likely more time consuming
and complex than resolving an individual claim is.168 For businesses,
it is much more expensive and perilous. Class arbitration “greatly
increases risks,” and the prospect of a massive judgment is more than
daunting for organizations.169 For consumers, it presents a potential
of attorney/client disparate interests with respect to settlement.170
However, the Court disingenuously distilled its assessment of class
arbitration in Concepcion by comparing its characteristics to those of
of individual arbitration.
The dissent rounded out the portrayal of class arbitration. In its
view, a class approach is consistent with arbitration’s fundamental
attributes and offers speed, efficiency, and cost advantages over
judicial class actions.171
Certainly more structure is needed in class arbitration than in
individually-brought arbitration.172 However, especially for
consumer claims arising from adhesion contracts, a class approach
can provide access to justice that may otherwise be foreclosed.173 A
class approach also can help correct a power imbalance between
business and consumers.174 Only the dissenting opinion, grasps the
import of preserving the right to collective consumer redress in the
modern reality of consumer contracts of adhesion.

166. Id.
167. Id. at 1758 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for AAA as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Neither Party, Stolt-Nielsen S. A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (No. 081198), 2009 WL 2896309, at *25).
168. Id. at 1750–51 (majority opinion) (referring to class issues such as certification,
discovery, and notice); see Moritz & Fitch, supra note 55, at 266–67.
169. Id. at 1752.
170. Moritz & Fitch, supra note 55, at 267.
171. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1759–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 1751 (majority opinion) (explaining that fairly formal procedures are necessary in
order to notify and bind absent class members, and to provide an opportunity for class members
to be heard).
173. See id. at 1760–61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 1759.
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3. The Concepcion Decision’s Impact on
Business, Consumers, and Dispute Resolution
Concepcion’s eradication of the Discover Bank rule was only
the tip of the iceberg. Early predictions that Concepcion would be a
watershed event for contracts, arbitration, consumer protection,175
and even employment arbitration176 were realized. “This is a gamechanger for businesses. It’s one of the most important and favorable
cases for businesses in a very long time.”177 The decision will
revitalize business interest in arbitration agreements and perhaps
even unconscionable practices. It will also make it less likely that
consumers will pursue small, yet valid, claims.
a. Business approach to arbitration
agreements in consumer contracts
Including waivers of class arbitration in consumer contracts is a
widespread practice. One 2004 article reported that of fifty-two
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts reviewed, 30.8 percent
contained waivers of class actions.178 The Searle Civil Justice
Institute, in a different study, found that 36.5 percent of arbitration
clauses examined included a class action waiver.179 This percentage
will only increase. Even “companies that calculated the pros and
cons of arbitration and rejected arbitration may want to reevaluate
their calculus and choose to require arbitration in their consumer

175. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Weighs Class-Action Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
10, 2010, at B3. Precluding class action would “gut the state’s substantive consumer protection
law.” Id. (quoting Concepcion counsel Deepak Gupta in oral argument). On the other hand,
allowing class claims would “sound a different sort of death knell . . . for the arbitration
provisions that were common in many standard-form contracts.” Id. (paraphrasing AT&T counsel
Andrew J. Pincus).
176. Sternlight, supra note 151. Sternlight predicted that a favorable ruling for AT&T
particularly could affect wage and hour claims, typically accumulated in class actions. Id.; see
Friedman et al., supra note 142 (“Although this was a consumer case, it could significantly
impact the development and enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration programs in the employment
context.”).
177. Liptak, supra note 12 (quoting Vanderbilt law professor Brian T. Fitzpatrick).
178. Aragaki, supra note 139, at 1261 (citing Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler,
“Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s
Experience, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2004, at 65).
179. Id. at 1261–62 (citing SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., CONSUMER ARBITRATION BEFORE
THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 103 (2009), available at http://www.adr.org/
si.asp?id=6610). Aragaki reports that this study found that while the use of class arbitration
waivers varied with the industry, they appeared in 100 percent of the cellular telephone contracts
surveyed. Id. at 1261 n.154.
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agreements.”180 While class arbitrations may persist postConcepcion,181 businesses may be able to avoid class action by
making simple changes in consumer contracts.182 The exception to
this new possibility may be financial services companies, which
“should consider the impact of possible rulemaking” by the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau pursuant to the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Protection Act on their standard consumer
contracts.183
b. Consumers and dispute resolution
While counsel for AT&T heralded its win as “a victory for
consumers,”184 that assessment should be confined to agreements
that contain earmarks of fairness. Unfortunately, the pro-consumer
provisions that were added to the AT&T-Concepcion contract are
“highly unusual.”185 The availability of the unconscionability defense
provided strong motivation for business to draft agreements fairly in
the pre-Concepcion environment; that motivation does not exist in
the post-Concepcion era. Consumers can look forward to unequal
cost burdens, limited discovery, short limitation periods, and onesided application of the clause. The inability to aggregate claims in

180. Friedman et al., supra note 142.
181. With respect to labor-related arbitrations, the NLRB recently ruled that it is a “violation
of federal labor law to require employees to sign arbitration agreements that prevent them from
joining together to pursue employment-related legal claims in any forum, whether in arbitration
or in court.” Board Finds That Certain Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Violate Federal Labor
Law, NLRB (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.nlrb.gov/news/board-finds-certain-mandatory-arbitrationagreements-violate-federal-labor-law; see also Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Supports Class
Action for Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2012, at B1 (describing the NLRB’s ruling that
employers’ arbitration agreements cannot ban workers from pursuing collective or class action).
With respect to whether class arbitrations persist generally, “[i]t remains to be seen whether, in
practice, the Supreme Court’s holdings in Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion sound a death-knell for
class action arbitration in the United States.” SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP, supra note
19, at 3–4.
182. See Liptak, supra note 12 (quoting Vanderbilt law professor Brian T. Fitzpatrick); see
also Sternlight, supra note 151 (anticipating that “[a] broad decision in favor of AT&T Mobility
could potentially allow companies in a variety of contexts to insulate themselves from class
action exposure by including class action waivers in their arbitration clauses.”).
183. The Impact of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion on Financial Services Companies:
Inclusion of Arbitration Clauses in Customer Contracts and the Impact of Dodd-Frank,
SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN LLP (May 24, 2011), http://www.sutherland.com/files/News/
0adf7d33-90b9-449b-a0d5-d95d5f228713/Presentation/NewsAttachment/7e906c35-c8c6-44ef8ac1-5d95b50221d6/TheImpactofATTMobilityvConcepcionMay2011.pdf.
184. Liptak, supra note 12.
185. Sternlight, supra note 151.
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arbitration will be just one of the hurdles for consumers to clear in
order for arbitration to be a viable avenue of dispute resolution.
i. Efficacy of individual versus
collective consumer dispute resolution
It is unlikely that companies with arbitration contracts will hear
complaints of consumers with the same clarity as they did before
Concepcion. After all, such waivers of class action in a consumer
contract, whether through litigation or arbitration, eliminate a
meaningful vehicle for consumers to seek redress for like grievances
collectively. The Discover Bank court evoked the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor in this regard:
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is
to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not
provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo
action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves
this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential
recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an
attorney’s) labor.186
On the other hand, the aggregation of even small claims, when
multiplied by as many as tens to hundreds of thousands of plaintiffs
or more, can have a powerful impact on business. This, too, was a
theme in the Court’s consideration of class power in its October 2010
term. For instance, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,187 the Court
blocked class certification of the employment discrimination claims
of 1.5 million plaintiffs seeking class certification.188 Had the Court

186. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1105–06 (Cal. 2005) (quoting
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997)); see Leitner & Goode, supra note
55, at 166–67 (“Congress found in its 2005 enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA)
that class actions ‘are an important and valuable part of the legal system when they permit the fair
and efficient resolution of legitimate claims of numerous parties.’”). In this vein, the court in
Discover Bank also noted:
The potential for millions of customers to be overcharged small amounts without an
effective method of redress cannot be ignored. Therefore, the provision violates
fundamental notions of fairness. . . . This is not only substantively unconscionable, it
violates public policy by granting Discover a “get out of jail free” card while
compromising important consumer rights.
Discover Bank, 113 P.3d. at 1108 (alteration in original) (citing Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118
Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 868 (Ct. App. 2002)). Ironically, the class action waiver in Concepcion may
very well have been valid under Discover Bank principles, but was not addressed by the Court.
187. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
188. Id. at 2547, 2561.
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affirmed class certification, the potential collective impact of their
claims would have enhanced the plaintiffs’ bargaining position
astronomically. In Concepcion, in assessing the risks of class actions
for defendants, the Court referred to “in terrorem” settlements “[b]ut
when damages allegedly owed to tens of thousands of potential
claimants are aggregated and decided at once, the risk of an error
will often become unacceptable. Faced with even a small chance of a
devastating loss, defendants will be pressured into settling
questionable claims.”189 This is especially troublesome when the
claims lack substance or merit.
While undoubtedly class actions have a dark side, or at least
negative side-effects that businesses want to avoid, they provide an
avenue for consumers to pursue claims they otherwise would not file.
There is little incentive for consumers to file a claim when the
amount in controversy is small; only if claims are aggregated is there
any meaningful remedy and deterrent. This is a “huge deal in the
world of consumer litigations, as many consumer challenges are only
brought through class actions.”190 Arguably, the AT&T arbitration
process was “free, fair, fast, easy to use and consumer friendly,” as
its counsel described it.191 However, even when this is the case, the
inherent drawback of pursuing small claims individually creates a
disincentive to proceed. Consumers will be even more discouraged
from proceeding with arbitration if businesses view the Concepcion
decision as an opportunity to revise contract arbitration processes to
provide fewer safeguards for customers.
ii. Arbitration and unconscionable practices
In addition to discouraging the pursuit of legitimate claims,
curtailing the availability of the class action arbitration vehicle
effectively insulates companies that perpetrate poor practices or even
downright fraudulent schemes. As the Discover Bank court noted:
The potential for millions of customers to be overcharged
small amounts without an effective method of redress

189. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011).
190. Sternlight, supra note 151 (discussing this fact under an assumption that the Court would
render “a broad decision in favor of AT&T,” as turned out to be the case). Sternlight further noted
that “[s]uch a ruling could also affect employment cases, particularly wage and hour claims,
which are typically presented in class actions.” Id.
191. Liptak, supra note 12.
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cannot be ignored. Therefore, the provision violates
fundamental notions of fairness. . . . This is not only
substantively unconscionable, it violates public policy by
granting Discover a “get out of jail free” card while
compromising important consumer rights.192
Unethical practices with respect to consumers and arbitration
agreements may increase post-Concepcion. Before the decision was
issued, one study showed that 68.5 percent of all unconscionability
cases over two years involved arbitration agreements, many times
more than reported two decades ago.193 During the same period, of
the arbitration agreements courts examined, 50.3 percent were
deemed unconscionable.194 The result of Concepcion may be to “gut
the state’s substantive consumer protection law because people will,
in the context of small frauds, not be able to bring those cases,”195 a
concern echoed by Justice Breyer in the dissenting opinion.196 With
state laws policing unconscionability preempted by the FAA, there is
good reason to believe that Concepcion will open the door to even
more problems for consumers.
IV. A CALL
FOR ACTION
The Concepcion Court emphasized the FAA’s provisions
requiring enforcement of arbitration agreements including waiver
agreements, as they are written. This certainly was consistent with
the FAA’s purpose to countermand a perceived judicial hostility to
arbitration.197 However, it was never intended to promote arbitration
over other dispute resolution mechanisms. To this end, from its
inception, the FAA policy protecting contractually agreed-on
arbitration was not without qualification; it explicitly preserves
defenses capable of invalidating a contract in whole or in part. The
Court glossed over these provisions and remained unimpressed by
the respective lack of bargaining power or consent inherent in
192. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1108 (Cal. 2005) (quoting Szetela v.
Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 868 (Ct. App. 2002)).
193. Aragaki, supra note 139, at 1286.
194. Id.
195. Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740
(2011) (No. 09-893) (quoting Concepcion counsel Deepak Gupta in oral argument).
196. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1756 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 1745 (majority opinion).

470

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:435

adhesion contracts. It was similarly unmoved by possible fraud
schemes in the formation or application of a contract. The Court’s
approach should clearly speak to congressional ears: act now. While
it is beyond the scope of this Article to prescribe the full text of a
consumer arbitration legislative model,198 a few recommendations
must be made.
A. Contract Defenses
at Law or Equity
That Congress preserved in section 2 of the FAA legal and
equitable grounds capable of defeating an arbitration clause reflects
Congress’s original purpose to set boundaries around the
enforcement of arbitration agreements.199 The language of section 2
limiting the enforcement of arbitration agreements (“save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract”) reflects congressional intent to retain an important role for
states with respect to arbitration agreements,200 unless the defenses
are those only applying to arbitration or arbitration agreements.201
Unfortunately, courts have downplayed the importance of this
express limitation even while they have proclaimed allegiance to
congressional intent. Although existing FAA exemptions should
have been sufficient to shelter the criteria for unconscionability
addressed by the Discover Bank rule, given the Concepcion ruling it
is now incumbent upon Congress to act again to reinforce FAA
consumer protections in a clear and unmistakable way, which at the
same time would preserve the state role with respect to contracts.
In addition, Congress needs to clarify whether indeed defenses
available at law and equity must only relate to the formation of the
contract at issue. Ironically, both the Discover Bank rule and Justice
Thomas’s concurring rationale for meeting the FAA exemption
emphasize that defenses asserted must arise from contract formation.
While Discover Bank does not require fraud in the inducement and
considers fraud in the substantive assessment of the impact of the

198. For comprehensive recommendation of such a model, see McGill, supra note 47, at 390–
412.
199. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1754–55 (Thomas, J., concurring).
200. Id. at 1756 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 1746 (majority opinion). For a discussion of state law with respect to
unconscionable contracts and the FAA, see Moritz & Fitch, supra note 55, at 269, 277–78.
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particular contract clause, Justice Thomas would only recognize a
defense that relates to the formation of the contract. Implicit in his
reasoning is the conclusion that Congress never intended to preserve
substantive unconscionability as an available defense.202 No matter
how unfair the impact of the clause, only irregularities in its
formation will defeat it. The recurrent flaw in this position, or
perhaps in the FAA language itself, is that contract formation was
markedly different in 1925 when Congress enacted the FAA. Online
arbitration clauses drafted solely by one party and added to the
contract after its formation could not have been within the
contemplation of the drafters, not to mention such changes occurring
in cyberspace.
B. Consumers, Arbitration,
and Class Action
Previous legislative attempts203 to contain mandatory consumer
and other arbitration, dubbed as attempts to “shrink the FAA’s
preemptive shadow,”204 have died on the table.205 But public reaction
to the sweeping Concepcion decision has been swift, loud, and
harsh;206 as a result, renewed legislative efforts to exempt consumer
and employment disputes from the application of the policy in favor
of arbitration are well underway.207 The Arbitration Fairness Act of
2011 (“AFA 2011”) was introduced in Congress on May 12, 2011,

202. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (Thomas, J., concurring). This position was not fully
argued or developed by the parties. Id. at 1754. Defects relating to the formation of a contract
eliminate policy considerations surrounding the unfair, harsh, or surprising impact of a clause—
important aspects of the Discover Bank rule. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100,
1108 (Cal. 2005).
203. See Aragaki, supra note 139, at 1272 n.214 for a listing of several legislative proposals
made in 2009 alone.
204. Id. at 1272.
205. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009); Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007).
206. See, e.g., Gutting Class Action: The Five Conservatives of the Supreme Court Chose
Corporations over Everyone Else, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2011, at A26. The opinion piece
describes the AFA 2011 as “a welcome effort to protect consumers, employees and others.” Id.
207. Senators Al Franken (D-Minn.) and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) and Representative
Hank Johnson (D-Ga.) announced the reintroduction of the Arbitration Fairness Act in a press
release on May 17, 2011. See Sens. Franken, Blumenthal, Rep. Hank Johnson Introduce
Legislation to Protect Legal Rights of Consumers, AL FRANKEN U.S. SENATOR FOR MINN.
(May 17, 2011), http://franken.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1514.
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and referred to committee.208 As did its 2009 predecessor,209 the
AFA 2011 proposes the invalidation of pre-dispute consumer
arbitration agreements and vests a court with subject-matter
jurisdiction over questions of validity and scope.210 However, the bill
remains silent as to the fate of class action or class arbitration
waivers and does not apply retroactively.211 An approach that would
permit a case-by-case determination of whether state law was in
conflict with the FAA,212 and one that would also examine
substantive unconscionability (as opposed to coercion in the
formation of an adhesion contract), should also be considered.213
At this juncture, more comprehensive and consumer-specific
congressional action is needed. The AFA 2011 goes beyond
consumer contracts and also purports to restrict arbitration of
employment and civil rights disputes. Although employment and
civil rights disputes share many of the same power imbalances that
consumers face, combining these broad categories into a one-sizefits-all solution denies the opportunity to focus on the unique issues
each presents. The omnibus approach also slows the approval
process and increases the chances that support may be fragmented.214
Specific legislation separately addressing the employment, civil
rights,215 and consumer contexts would be preferable.
208. H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011). The 2011 bills do not refer
to franchise disputes as the 2009 versions did and now refer to civil rights disputes specifically.
Compare S. 987 § 3 (referring to civil rights disputes but not franchise disputes), and H.R. 1873
§ 3 (referring to civil rights disputes but not franchise disputes), with H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 3
(2009) (referring to franchise disputes), and S. 931, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009) (referring to franchise
disputes).
209. H.R. 1020 § 4.
210. H.R. 1873 § 3.
211. H.R. 1873 § 4; S. 987 § 4 (“This Act, and the amendments made by this Act, shall take
effect on the date of enactment of this Act and shall apply with respect to any dispute or claim
that arises on or after such date.”).
212. See Aragaki’s discussion of a more refined approach to a preemption analysis, supra
note 139, at 1280–81.
213. See id. (advancing a pre-Concepcion discussion of this model).
214. The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 pooled consumer, employment, and franchise
disputes into one bill. H.R. 1020 § 4. The 2011 incarnation drops franchise disputes and includes
civil rights disputes and even some labor statutory rights. H.R. 1873 § 3. Categories that did not
proceed through the hearings that were held in the fall of 2009 will undoubtedly slow the hearing
process for the new bill. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009).
215. This is needed as a result of 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009), in
which the Court found that a collective bargaining agreement waived an individual bargaining
unit member’s right to pursue a statutory discrimination claim in court. For a discussion of
proposed legislation protecting a collective bargaining union member’s statutory discrimination
claims, see McGill & Tracey, supra note 22, at 64–68.
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An effective approach must preserve collective redress in either
the judicial or arbitral forum or both. This is noticeably absent from
the proposed AFA 2011 legislation. Congress should invalidate
waivers of collective consumer action along with pre-dispute
arbitration agreements.
C. Retroactivity
Other crucial consumer issues remain unresolved by the AFA
2011. Given the continuing nature of many consumer contracts,
retroactive application is essential. Many consumers will be
functioning under cell phone and credit card agreements entered into
years ago; preexisting arbitration clauses should not be allowed to
defeat congressional intent. Further, one-sided amendment rights,
allowing a business to change the rules in the middle of a contract
period, should not be applicable to dispute resolution. The proposed
bill contemplates application to “disputes” arising after the AFA
2011 comes into force, so there is room to argue that the bill covers
all new disputes regardless of the timing of an agreement. Still, many
disputes will be continuous or will straddle the effective date. Clearer
retroactivity is required.
D. Consumer Disputes
Defined
The AFA 2011 provides a very narrow definition of a consumer
dispute, as a dispute that relates to property acquired for personal,
family, or household purposes.216 Missing is the word “primarily,”
which appeared in the 2009 bill. Many consumers purchase mixeduse goods, such as computers and cell phones, that they use for both
work and home application. Disputes relating to these products
appear to not be covered by the proposed legislation. Finally, the
AFA 2011 does not regulate post-dispute arbitration agreements in
any way. The principles of unconscionability should apply to these
agreements and clarification is necessary in the post-Concepcion
world.

216. H.R. 1873 § 3.
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E. Unconscionability
It could be argued that the arbitration clause in Concepcion,
when taken in its entirety, was not overly unfair to the consumer. It
applied to both AT&T and the consumer, preserved the small-claimscourt forum, and imposed penalties on AT&T for lowball offers; it is
more balanced than many of its predecessors.217 But the preConcepcion application of unconscionability must be credited for
bringing a sense of fair play to the drafting of these clauses.
Congress must preserve a comparable inducement to ensure that
those drafting post-dispute agreements have the same incentive to be
fair.
Even where contracts contain arguably “fair” class arbitration
waivers, the concerns articulated in Discover Bank with respect to
unconscionable contracts are far from resolved. For instance,
preserving a small-claims-court forum for individual claims, as the
AT&T clause did, inadequately addresses issues common to large
groups of consumers, such as improper fees, service charges, time of
crediting payments, or, in the Concepcions’ case, whether the phone
they received was “free.” Without the notice feature of a class action,
consumers may be unaware of the potential problem. In addition,
requiring each consumer to bring a small claims or other individual
action provides no deterrence to companies that engage in sloppy or
illegal practices.218 Further, the Court’s foray into state law defining
and confining unconscionability leaves many questions unanswered
with respect to whether and to what extent states can regulate unfair
practices, or even fraud, when the specter of arbitration looms.219
Congress should amend the FAA explicitly to allow for the
exemptions under the terms provided by the Discover Bank rule or to
allow other substantive standards of fairness, such as mutual
application of the choice of forum and cost protection for

217. See, e.g., Seidel v. TELUS Commc’ns, Inc., [2011] 1 S.C.R. 531, 25, 46 (Can.) (finding
that where unconscionability was not available to defeat arbitration clauses, the TELUS clause
applied only to consumers, not businesses; had no cost protection; and removed small claims
court as an option).
218. See Sternlight, supra note 151 (stating that a possible rationale for such class actions is
to deter companies from behaving fraudulently).
219. “ATT Mobility LLC did not entirely block courts from rejecting arbitration provisions as
unconscionable.” Friedman et al., supra note 142, at 3.
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consumers.220 Congress should also improve procedural fairness by
requiring mandatory disclosure of terms, incorporating cancellation
rights, and articulating base line arbitration safeguards.221 At the
same time, businesses should take responsibility for ensuring fair
contract provisions in these respects.
V. CONCLUSION
The Discover Bank rule and other similar jurisprudence
precluding enforcement of contractual provisions that are
substantively and procedurally unconscionable fell by the wayside in
Concepcion, at least with respect to class action arbitration waivers.
The majority’s flawed view, that it should promote the goals of
arbitration rather than interpret the limits of arbitration policy
established by the FAA, set it on a course that disregarded the
realities of the consumer market. Unfortunately, the ruling reverses
gains made toward protecting consumers in adhesion agreements,
such as those protections embodied in decisions like Discover Bank.
The repercussions of Concepcion go much further than
validating class arbitration waivers: the decision virtually eliminates
the unconscionability defense from the FAA exemption. In an effort
to prevent manipulation of unconscionability to perpetuate judicial
bias against arbitration, the Concepcion majority dogmatically
ignored the abuse delivered to consumers by one-sided and unfair
arbitration clauses in which they had no input.
By restricting a court’s ability to examine the specific aspects of
a particular arbitration clause and to consider them when assessing
the substantive unconscionability of a clause, the Court gave carte
blanche to businesses seeking to insulate themselves from consumer
complaints. So devout was the majority’s allegiance to the policy in
favor of arbitration that it overrode Congress’s intent and completely
removed unconscionability as an available ground for revoking an
arbitration clause in any circumstance.

220. EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT,
181, 375–76 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006); McGill, supra note 47, at 390–412.
221. The FAA does not address arbitration processes; this is left to the agreement of the
parties. Compare McGill & Tracey, supra note 22, at 13–16 (commenting on the FAA’s failure to
discuss arbitration processes), with the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169
(2006) (failing also to discuss arbitration processes).
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At this juncture, consumer-focused congressional action is
necessary to protect consumers and to restore to them meaningful
contractual bargaining power and remedies. A more balanced
approach to the purposes of the FAA is needed; the legislation must
be a vehicle to secure the enforcement of arbitration agreements,
subject to legal and equitable defenses, and not merely a directive to
promote the underlying objectives of arbitration. Congress must tip
the scales of justice so that, as the Court before Concepcion said
repeatedly, courts treat arbitration agreements “like all other
contracts.”222

222. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1761 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 447 (2006)).

